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In early December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. The commitment involved an end to decades of conflict in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Weeks later, however, a starkly different strategy for instability emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Shift in Policy

This dichotomy exemplifies the core feature of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on commerce and stopping hostilities—though how this squares with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative stated this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Inconsistencies

This change is significant, but observers note it is premature to judge its results. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Tensions

Differing from his recent predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major dispute has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Diplomacy and Targeted Action

A similar standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the forceful rhetoric may have pushed the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Observers describe the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.